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NATALIA VLAS 
SERGIU GHERGHINA 
CONVERGENCE OR REPLACEMENT? 
ATTITUDES TOWARDS POLITICAL AND 
RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS IN 
CONTEMPORARY ROMANIA 
Unlike other Post-Communist countries, Romania 
displays three clear individual-level trends related to 
political and religious institutions. The Romanians are 
the most supportive for the EU and Church, and the 
most critical towards national political institutions in 
the region. By conducting an empirical longitudinal 
study on the Romanian population, we aim to 
understand the linkages between these two trends and 
to identify what can explain the high level of trust 
vested by the Romanian citizens in the Orthodox 
Church in the post-Communist period. In doing so, we 
test two alternative explanations and we employ 
bivariate and multivariate statistics. The results indicate 
that there is weak evidence for the relationship 
between trust in political and religious institutions, 
with a stronger emphasis on the EU aspect. Whenever 
the attitudes are linked, they are consistent: positive 
attitudes towards the national government and 
Parliament trigger positive attitudes towards the 
Church. 
Introduction 
The breakdown of Communism and the sudden disintegration of USSR 
transformed the former “Iron Curtain” countries into seekers of systems to 
replace the old regime – both in economic and political terms. Using 
Huntington’s conceptual language about the third wave of 
democratization, the political transition from autocracy to democracy 
rests on a premise that a regression to the political status quo ante is 
unlikely1. As examples from the regions show up, this paradigmatic shift 
does not imply successful democratization. One can identify four distinct 
categories of the former Communist states according to their level of 
democratization: (1) states that democratized (the EU joiners), (2) states 
that returned to the former regime (Belarus), (3) states that chose a 
different type of an authoritarian regime than before (Azerbaijan, 
Turkmenistan), and (4) states that did not clearly define their course 
(Russia). 
Out of the new democratic countries that became EU members in less 
then two decades from the regime change, Romania displays three 
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contrasting features in the European surveys2. First of all, until recently all 
the candidate countries shared a common feature: their citizens displayed 
high levels of support for the EU, some 10% above the old member states 
support average3. In this cluster of optimism, Romania is the most 
supportive country with an average support around 75%. Second, the level 
of trust in national institutions is considerably lower compared to 
international institutions and among the smallest in the region. Between a 
quarter and one third of Romanians declare confidence in the institutions 
that should represent and govern them. The slow institutional 
development, the lack of political reforms, and extended corruption 
scandals that characterize the post-Communist political environment may 
explain these reluctant attitudes. Moreover, there are considerably more 
transition losers than winners4 and the negative attitudes may be 
associated with thoughts of punishment. Third, Romania is the champion 
of confidence in the Church, with levels comparable to those displayed by 
Western Catholic Countries and by far the most supportive among the 
Orthodox countries. At the same time, the Church is the most supported 
institution, with four out of five Romanians declaring constant support for 
the Church.  
These clearly observable trends provide a blurry picture and a 
puzzling situation. Although at first sight it may appear that trust in 
national institutions is lowered at the expense of trust in international 
institutions, a recent study finds no relationship between the two: 
Romanians are supportive towards the EU irrespective of their trust in 
national institutions.5 If the absence of this relationship is clear, what 
happens with the other two possible connections? On the one hand, it is 
unclear if the trust in Church grows at the expense of political institutions, 
the former being seen as an alternative to the corrupt and unappealing 
political class. If so, it is necessary to discover the mechanisms that lead 
citizens to vest more confidence in a hierarchical, non-democratic and 
non-transparent institution than to political representation and 
government bodies. The puzzle becomes even more complicated when we 
think that these political institutions represent the alternative to 
Communism, a regime where religion was officially forbidden. On the 
other hand, it is unclear why religion and confidence in the EU go hand in 
hand. The latter may be considered a threat to national identity, whereas 
the Orthodox Church may represent the guarantee for Romanian 
traditions, as well as cultural and religious preservation. This conservative 
character and discourse of the Church does not correspond to the 
continuous discourse towards development initiated at the EU level. 
However, if the EU is considered the opposite of Communism, better 
fulfilling the tasks of national institutions, then positive attitudes towards 
both Church and the EU may be justified. To solve this puzzle, we try to 
answer the following research question: What can explain the high level of 
trust vested by the Romanian citizens in the Orthodox Church in the post-
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Communist period? In doing so, we test two alternative explanations that 
target the relationship between the above mentioned variables by 
conducting longitudinal research on surveys collected at European level.  
Answering this question is relevant for two main reasons. First, it 
addresses this dilemma from an empirical perspective, complementing the 
extensive descriptions and analyses that emphasize the role of the Church 
in Romanian society.6 By explaining attitudinal trends in the most recent 
decade, focusing on three individual-level factors, one will set the grounds 
for further research. Second, this study adds to the rather limited post-
Communist public opinion literature, quite often consisting mostly of 
attitudes towards the EU.7 This study tests two potential explanatory 
variables for the high level of trust in religious institutions: confidence in 
domestic political institutions and in the EU. The first is useful in the 
context of the increased role of domestic political institutions in society’s 
life, whereas the second has, to our knowledge, not been tested for 
Romania before.  
Our article summarizes first the main explanations in the relevant 
literature and advances two specific hypotheses that include the factors 
that are theoretically important for understanding public support for the 
Church in Romania. Second, we test the hypotheses by conducting 
bivariate analyses involving cross-tabulations and logistic regression. We 
conclude by reflecting on the findings, their implications, and on future 
research on public support for religious institutions in a new EU member 
state. 
Theoretical Expectations 
A starting point in our attempt to draw a theoretical framework for 
analysis is to emphasize the dichotomy between Eastern and Western 
Christianity with respect to its relationship to political power. Thus, it has 
to be pointed out that – in contrast to the Western political tradition that 
emphasizes political pluralism, the separation of powers (including the 
separation between the religious and the secular), and the checks and 
balances system – the Eastern European countries were characterized by 
highly centralized states and weak societies and by the continuous 
intermingling between the State and the Church.8 Whereas the former 
witnessed the rivalry between the ruler and the Church creating the 
possibility of a third group of autonomous parties (i.e. commercial, 
scientific, and urban) to emerge,9 in Eastern Europe, especially within the 
predominantly Orthodox countries, the Byzantine concept of symphonia, 
which designates “the cooperation between the Church and state in the 
fulfillment of their goals, each supporting the other and neither being 
subordinated to the other” bound the state and the Church so closely 
together that the latter becomes a state Church.10 Consequently, the state 
was dominant and the society very weak.11  
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Such a situation determined many researchers to deny the Orthodox 
Church a positive role in democratic consolidation in this part of Europe 
after the fall of communism. Thus, although widely acknowledging the role 
that religious institutions, personalities and ideas played in the process of 
democratization across a wide range of societies, most social scientists who 
have studied this phenomenon tended to argue that Catholic and 
Protestant forms of Christianity are compatible with democracy, ignoring 
or dismissing Orthodox Christianity as incompatible with it.12 Very few 
others have tried to prove that Orthodoxy is also compatible with 
democracy, in theory and in practice, though having to admit that the 
Orthodox Churches “often display a certain ambivalence about key 
elements of the pluralism that characterizes democratic regimes.”13 
In Romania, in compliance with the Byzantine model of symphonia, the 
Romanian Orthodox Church (ROC) had a constant policy of accommodation 
with the rulers of the day, which allowed it a privileged status among the 
other religious denominations, including during the communist period14 
and after 1989, and often positioned itself in opposition to the languidly 
emergent civil society.15 As opposed to the other dominant Churches in 
Central Europe, which after the fall of communism, remained part of the 
civil society whose activity counterbalances the state, the ROC (just as the 
Orthodox Churches in the Balkans and in the former Soviet Union) 
remained an ally of the state rather than part of the civil society.16 In this 
respect, the ROC had numerous attempts and aggressive campaigns for its 
recognition as the national Church17 (in 1994, for instance, it proclaimed 
itself as the national Church18), and despite being unsuccessful, “proved 
that the Orthodox Church rejects the notion that Romania is a religiously 
plural country and is prepared to go the extremes to gain de jure 
recognition for its de facto domination as primus inter pares among the 
religious denominations of Romania.”19 Also, the enduring dispute 
surrounding the construction of a new Orthodox cathedral put the ROC at 
odds with the civil society. Thus, while for the Church the cathedral 
“symbolizes the central place Orthodoxy occupies in the heart and mind of 
the nation…and serves as a symbolic compensation for the failure of 
politicians to grant the Orthodox Church national Church status”, “for civil 
society, the cathedral represents a symbol of intolerance, clericalism, a 
waste of resources or, more importantly, a shameful rewriting of the 
recent past aimed at recasting the Orthodox Church from a supporter to a 
critic of the communist regime.”20  
It must also be recalled that after 1989, the ROC tried very hard to 
acquire a special status in the Romanian Constitution and political 
establishment, which would grant the Orthodox clergy reserved seats in 
the Parliament, would make the religious education compulsory, would 
maintain the legislation against homosexuals and abortion and would 
refuse to return the disputed properties to the Greek Catholics.21 With all 
means, the ROC tried to secure its benefits (legal or patrimonial, and also 
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those of symbolic authority) by tightening its relationship with the central 
and local authorities.22 Indeed, after 1989, the government granted the ROC 
many advantages, including the introduction of religious education in 
public schools, and an increased presence on the state-controlled media. 
Moreover, the ROC was close to being recognized officially as the national 
church, in 1999, when prime minister Radu Vasile amended the draft of a 
new religious law in favor of the Orthodox Church.23 
Therefore, instead of positioning itself in the ranks of civil society and 
thus contributing to the consolidation of democracy in Romania, after 
1989, the ROC made constant attempts to ally with the state and to receive 
advantages from this alliance. 
And, as observers note, the weakness or inertia of civil society may 
represent a basic limitation so far on democratic consolidation across the 
region.24 These developments, among others, made researchers argue that 
ROC “is acting in a way injurious to the development of a stable and 
functioning liberal democracy in Romania.”25  
However, for its disparaged image, and despite the fact that many 
deny the Orthodox Church a positive role in Romania’s democratization 
process, the ROC managed to present itself in a favorable light, or as a 
“martyr Church”26 thus gaining the trust of four in five Romanians.27 And it 
is worth noting that the high level of confidence in the Church goes hand 
in hand with the lack of confidence in the democratic institutions of state 
in Romania. How can this be? 
As some studies show, the more a democracy is stable and perceived 
as “satisfactory” and the less corrupt it is, the more people trust the state’s 
institutions.28 In Romania, however, the transition process after 1989 was 
dominated for a long time by former regime elements and this created 
difficulties for democratic consolidation.29 The continuity of the old 
communist-style politics and the persistence of old communist elites with 
Leninist mentalities on the political scene for so many years after the 
revolution in Romania30 might have contributed to the bad image earned 
by the political institutions. “Romania’s postcommunists did not free 
themselves from authoritarian reflexes when they became ‘pro-
European’,” and “the democratization process has been slower than in all 
other postcommunist countries in the region,” being “bogged down by its 
postcommunist legacy – widespread pessimism and apathy, political 
dilettantism, clientelism, and a level of corruption that the EU Foreign 
Affairs Commission diplomatically called “a major source of concern,” as 
some scholars observed.31   
In this context, it seems like the Orthodox Church managed to 
“capitalize on other political actors’ loss of capital in the face of the 
hardships of transition,” since “both the institutions ranking highest in 
popularity polls, the Church and the army, are non-elected, strictly 
hierarchical bodies which have neither been involved directly in the 
economic life of Romanians nor required to propose concrete programmes 
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of socioeconomic rehabilitation.”32 The dissatisfaction with the political 
class was voiced even by some Orthodox leaders such as Archbishop 
Anania who, in the mid 1998 (a few years after the failed attempt of the 
ROC to coerce President Iliescu to grant Synod members senatorial seats), 
as a counterpoise to “the unwanted who rule us”, “proposed that the 
Church select candidates for parliamentary mandates, and that priests 
urge believers during sermons to vote for people whom the Church 
trusted.”33 
As a result, we hypothesize that in the Romanian case, the Church 
replaces the political institutions that should bring democracy closer to the 
citizens. Accordingly, we expect those respondents that do not trust 
domestic political institutions to vest more confidence in ROC: 
 
H1: People that lack trust in national political institutions have the 
tendency to trust the Church compared with the rest of citizens. 
  
With respect to the second problem raised above, there are several 
elements that would make us conceive the relationship between ROC and 
the EU as a problematic one and would make us believe that the ROC would 
have a negative stance towards the EU. It cannot be denied, for instance, 
that many of the EU’s values run contrary to those promoted by ROC.34  
There was at least one particular moment when the latter’s doctrine came 
in harsh conflict with the European Union’s demand – the abrogation of 
the Constitution’s Article 200 that considers homosexuality as a crime.35 In 
this respect, the old law, which prohibited homosexuality, was endorsed by 
the majority of the Romanians and also by the other religious 
denominations. However, the most vociferous were the orthodox 
personalities. One example is that of the then Archbishop and now 
Metropolitan Bartolomeu Anania, who said that “Europe prompts us to 
accept homosexuality, electronics, drugs, abortion, and genetic 
engineering. Therefore joining this ‘impoverished, despiritualised’ union is 
pointless, especially since ‘in terms of culture and civilisation we have been 
there first.’”36  
Moreover, the persistent symphonia model37 of the relations between 
State and Church, or, to say it more directly, the status of a “pseudo-state 
church” of the ROC,38 runs contrary to the separation between the two 
promoted in Western Europe39 and the integration in the EU would mean a 
waning influence of the ROC in the political realm.40  
Also, the integration in the EU could be perceived as a threat to the 
national identity of the member states and given that the Romanian 
national identity partially overlaps the orthodox identity, we would expect 
the ROC to have a reticent attitude towards the EU. In this context, the 
ROC’s attempts to position itself as pivotal for the very definition of 
‘Romanianism’ since the emergence of the national consciousness in 
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Europe, must be recalled.41  Undoubtedly, Orthodoxy represented an 
important element in the forging and defense of the national identity in 
the course of history, both in Moldavia and Wallachia (known as “The Old 
Kingdom”) and also in Transylvania, where, despite the fact that the 
population was more ethnically and religiously diverse when compared to 
the Old Kingdom42, the importance of the Orthodox church “as a defender 
of religion and promoter of Romanian nationalism was even more marked 
than in the Old Kingdom,” due to the official politics of the Magyarization 
of all ethnic groups, during the second half of the 19th century.43 Some 
authors also emphasize the role played by the Orthodox Church in the 
construction of the Romanian state, after the unification of the 
principalities, “by reinforcing the mythologizing of political figures from 
the Romanian past, thus making a connection between the newly-
established state and previous rulers.”44 
Given the fact that even after 1989, in its attempts to restore its 
prestige, the ROC constantly emphasized the link between Orthodoxy and 
“Romanianism” and the crucial task of preserving the Romanian identity in 
the face of modernization, globalization, secularization and religious 
proselytism,45 we would expect the ROC to have a reticent attitude towards 
the EU, as already mentioned.  
Another reason for the Orthodox Church’s reticence toward the EU 
would be the fact that the origins of the European project lies with some 
very committed Catholic and Christian Democratic politicians and the 
Romanian Orthodox Church’s nationalism was traditionally seen as being 
associated with a bias against Western European Christianity.46 
Under these circumstances, we would expect the Church to use its 
influence in opposing the EU and in undermining people’s confidence in 
the EU. But data shows an increased level of confidence in both 
institutions. One stream of literature contends that the strength of the 
Orthodox Church in Romania may have helped push public opinion toward 
integration with Europe and explain thus the high level of confidence in 
both institutions. Some authors47 explain the apparent contradiction 
between ROC’s interests and actions towards the EU by arguing that under 
the pressure of the believers’ secular goals – the desire to accomplish the 
century old dream of joining in the European kind of modernity, and at 
times instrumented by the state (in exchange for the advantages that the 
state granted the Church due to the historically close relationship between 
them), the ROC had to “prove that it was open to the new and did not dwell 
on reminiscences from the past.” Accordingly, the ROC tried to asses the 
compatibility between Orthodox spirituality and the European Union and 
involved actively in the process. Others consider that the marginalized 
status of the Churches during the communist period made them want to 
embrace the democratic values of the West.48 This line of argument 
emphasizes the Romanian Orthodox Church’s power in shaping the 
  
Vlas, Gherghina Convergence or Replacement? 
Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies, 8, 24 (Winter 2009) 77 
political opinions of the population and its ability to influence people’s 
attitudes. 
In this sense, the literature reveals few theoretical and empirical 
studies on the issue of religion affecting the attitudes toward the European 
Union. Mac Iver (1989)49 was one of the few researchers who considered 
the role of religiosity in the shaping of the attitudes of western Europeans 
toward the EC. In the ‘80s she argued that those who claim that their 
religious beliefs play a role in their political preferences reveal a higher 
level of support for the EC and she explained that by emphasizing the 
transnational character of Christian social teaching. According to her 
observations, Catholicism is the most supportive for EU integration, 
followed by Orthodoxy (both universalistic in orientation), while 
Protestantism (more particularistic) is more skeptical and reticent toward 
the integration and toward any project intended to weaken the force of the 
nation state, since the nation states have historically guaranteed its 
survival over time. Later, the role of religion as a determinant of people’s 
attitudes toward European integration and the EU was emphasized in a 
series of studies.50 In one of their studies, Fraser, Nelson and Guth 
demonstrated that there is a connection between religious affiliation and 
religious commitment on the one hand and the attitudes toward the 
European Community on the other hand. Thus, they proved that Catholics 
and Orthodox are more positive about the integration, while Protestants 
are less enthusiastic, secularists and sectarians being even less supportive 
than Protestants – testing therefore Mac Iver’s observations more than a 
decade ago. “Thus, there appears to be a religious continuum from the 
most “universalistic” Churches to the most “particularistic”, with the 
former favoring the Community and the latter much less enthusiastic.” 
They also demonstrated that the stronger the religious commitment, the 
stronger support for European integration. “Although the traditions differ 
in their level of support for the EU, within each tradition Churchgoers are 
more pro-integration.”51  
Nelsen and Guth made the first attempt at exploring the impact of 
religion on attitudes toward European integration in post-communist 
Europe, paying particular attention to the role of religious tradition and 
Church attendance to the formation of attitudes.52 They argue that the 
Christian religion is a strong predictor for the people’s attitudes towards 
the EU due to four main reasons. First, it has a strong universalist tendency 
in order to spread their religion and attain disciples. Second, the Church is 
against the modern state. It considers that the unity of all believers is made 
visible in their own Churches and distrusts the modern nation states that 
have so deeply and disastrously divided Europe. Thus, they see the EU as an 
alternative to the current situation and also a way to diminish the unity of 
Church’s contesters (e.g. Protestants). Third, one of the cultural pillars of 
the EU is the Christian religion, founded by Catholic or predominantly 
Catholic countries in the 1950s that were led by Christian Democratic 
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politicians. Finally, the EU means a larger community and the Church 
encourages such a behavior for opposing individualism.53 
Other studies emphasized the relationship between the attitudes 
toward European accession and democratic hopes, suggesting that people 
looked to the EU to help strengthen democracy.54 In Romania, the strong 
support for the EU could also reflect a frustration with the functioning of 
national institutions,55 as Romania has been largely unable to ensure a 
proper functioning of the democratic institutions and in introducing 
adequate anti-corruption measures.56 Democracy in Romania is still 
unstable and unconsolidated and therefore, “more open to conditionality 
impacts” (from the EU).57 Given these two directions in the literature, we 
expect to observe a direct relationship between  confidence in the EU and 
in the Church: 
 
H2: Respondents that have confidence in the EU display a higher level 
of trust towards the Church compared with the rest of citizens.  
Data, variables, and measurement 
To test the hypotheses, we use candidate countries and standard 
Eurobarometer survey data from 2002 to 2007. Since our hypotheses try to 
longitudinally identify individual-level mechanisms and connections, these 
surveys are appropriate as they include large comparable datasets in terms 
of standardized questionnaires, sampling method and data collection. 
Trust in Church or religious institutions and in the EU is operationalized as 
the answer of the Romanian respondents to questions directly involving 
these issues: “How much trust do you have in …?” There are three response 
alternatives: “tend to trust” (1), “tend not to trust” (2), and “don’t know” 
(3). All respondents providing the latter answer were eliminated from the 
sample, being considered missing values.  
For the first hypothesis, the level of trust in domestic political 
institutions needs to be assessed. Consequently, we create a new variable 
that combines the level of trust in the national legislature and government 
as these are the institutions that clearly prevails over other political actors 
in the state.58 The Eurobarometer questionnaires have two separate 
questions, similar with those for Church and the EU that ask the citizens 
about the trust in Parliament and government, both with dichotomous 
answers of trust/do not trust. We code trust as 1 and the lack of trust as 0 
for each of the two institutions and the new variable (i.e. the index of trust 
in domestic political institutions) is the sum of these scores (i.e. minimum 
value 0, maximum value 2). Individuals that do not express their 
confidence in national institutions (“do not know”) are treated as missing 
values.  
We use two conceptual equivalences. First, we consider as 
synonymous the Church and the religious institutions. In the first survey 
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we used, the question of trust refers to Church, whereas in the rest of the 
surveys the questions refer to trust in religious institutions. The most 
familiar religious institution to most Romanians is the Church and the 
identity of the two in their perceptions can be easily argued. Second, 
without information on the religious affiliation of the respondents 
(Orthodox, Catholic, etc) we assume that the used sample includes a fairly 
reduced number of non-Orthodox respondents, similar to what statistics 
indicate and thus it does not bias our conclusions regarding ROC. 
Additionally, we make the assumption that levels of confidence in the 
Catholic and Orthodox Church do not differ considerably.  
We start our analysis with bivariate statistics (cross-tabulations) to 
test the hypothesized relationships between variables, whereas the final 
part of our analysis focuses on binary logistic regression that allows one to 
investigate the extent to which trust in domestic political institutions and 
in the EU explains the high levels of confidence in the religious 
institutions.  
Stability in attitudes towards the Church 
The puzzling trends described at the beginning of this article are 
consistent with the figures included in table 1. These elements of 
descriptive statistics illustrate how the trust in the Church, in the EU and 
the lack of trust in domestic political institutions evolved between 2002 
and 2007. These figures are consistent with, but slightly different from, the 
aggregate reports summarizing the results of the Eurobarometers in every 
country. The reason is represented by the elimination of the missing values 
and the weighting of every variable within the survey. Thus, some of the 
percentages indicate a clearer trend that we initially expect. As we can 
easily observe, the trust in religious institutions is stable, with a peak of 
90% of respondents declaring support for the Church in 2002 and the 
lowest level in 2006 (81%). However, the relevance of these small 
oscillations is decreased when looking at the error generated by the 
sampling methods. Consequently, we can asses that nine out of ten 
Romanians display consistent support for the Church in the analyzed 
period of time. 
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Table 1: Trust in Church, national institutions and the EU 
Romania Percentage/Year 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Trust in Church 90 85 86 86 81 83 
Lack of trust in national institutions 57 60 57 65 66 74 
Trust in the EU 80 74 85 76 77 76 
810 ≤ N ≤ 977 
Source: CCEBs and EBs, 2002-2007. 
 
High values and triggered fluctuations are seen with respect to the 
lack of trust in national political institutions. Overall, almost two thirds of 
the Romanian citizens display a lack of confidence in their main political 
representatives. There is a peak of 74% (2007) of citizens that trust neither 
their government nor legislature and two minimal points of 57% in 2002 
and 2004. Two periods may be distinguished along the six years: their lack 
of trust in national institutions is stable until 2004, and starting in 2005 its 
increase by an average of 10% becomes visible. Without speculating on this 
decrease after 2004, it is relevant to notice that the trust in the EU also 
decreases after that year. Regarding the latter, the EU was trusted by eight 
out of ten Romanians until 2004, their percentage becoming stable around 
three quarters of the population after that moment. Overall, we may think 
that Romanians became more skeptical about the political institutions 
after 2004 without distinguishing between national and international 
layers of these institutions.  
These general trends strengthen the initial puzzle and lead us to an 
investigation of the bivariate relationships between the trust in Church 
and the trust in domestic political institutions on the one hand, and 
international institutions on the other hand (cross-tabulations from tables 
2 and 3). These tables contain the relevant percentages and a measure of 
the strength of the relationship as indicated by the correlation coefficient 
(somer’s d). 
National politics and religion: together for better and worse 
Table 2 presents the percentages of people that display supportive 
attitudes for the domestic political institutions and Church. For the entire 
analyzed period we observe a relatively weak, but statistically significant 
positive relationship between the trust attitudes. These trends go against 
our expectation that a lack of trust in domestic political institutions 
coincides with more trust vested in the religious institution. People that do 
not trust their national political institutions are least likely to trust the 
Church when compared to those that have medium or high trust in the 
national decision-makers (column one, rows 10-15). The highest level of 
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trust is registered for people that trust both institutions (column three, 
rows 10-15). For example, in 2003 the trust for the Church was 79% among 
the Romanians that do not trust their major national institutions, 86% 
among the group that trusts only one of the two institutions, and 95% 
among the citizens that held positive attitudes towards both government 
and Parliament.  
At the same time, the difference between the group of people that 
trust the Church and only one institution (i.e. medium) and the people that 
trust both political institutions (95%) and the Church is smaller that the 
difference of percentages between those that trust the Church and fall in 
the medium (90%) and lack of trust (approximately 80%) categories for the 
domestic institutions.  
 
Table 2. Trust in political and religious institutions 
Trust in national institutions  
Trust in Church? Lack Medium Trust 
No 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
 
 
13% 
21 
18 
18 
24 
21 
 
 
5% 
14 
11 
14 
12 
15 
 
 
4% 
5 
9 
4 
9 
4 
 
Yes  
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
 
 
87% 
79 
82 
82 
76 
79 
 
 
95% 
86 
89 
86 
88 
85 
 
 
96% 
95 
91 
96 
91 
96 
 
Strength of relationship 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
 
0.15 
0.18 
0.1 
0.14 
0.16 
0.14 
Notes: 
- For the frequency table on trust in Church and in national institutions, see 
Table 1. 
- All relationships are significant at the 0.01 level. 
- 866 ≤ N ≤ 922 
- Source CCEBs and EBs, 2002-2007. 
 
A close look at the lack of trust in Church complements these findings 
and provides a clearer picture that strengthens the evidence that goes 
against the hypothesized relationship. For the entire analyzed period, one 
in five Romanians who lack trust in political institutions has a similar 
attitude towards the religious institutions. According to our hypothesis, we 
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would expect to see people that trust both political institutions to most 
distrust the Church. The empirical reality shows that approximately five in 
100 Romanians are satisfied with the work of their representative 
institutions mention that they do not trust the Church, the smallest 
percentage of all. The intermediary values are registered among the 
respondents that have trust in one of the political institutions 
(approximately 10%).  
In a nutshell, the evidence goes against hypothesis 1. Contrary to 
theoretical reasons and expectations, for the period 2002-2007 Romanians 
who do not trust their national political institutions are less likely to trust 
the Church than people who partially or fully trust their government or 
Parliament. The evidence indicates a somewhat simpler mechanism than 
the one presented: people that have trust in political institutions also trust 
the religious ones. Those that are skeptical about politics, adopt similar 
attitudes towards the Church. As a result, irrespective of the performance 
of the national political institutions, the Church is not seen as a 
replacement, it does not provide the substitute for a failure of 
representation. In this respect, the Church does not benefit from 
attachment as a result of the negative attitudes towards politics. Instead, at 
the aggregate level, it successfully tackles two paradoxical trends. On the 
one hand, it attracts almost all citizens with positive attitudes towards 
domestic political institutions and on the other hand the respect and trust 
for the Church is very high despite a decrease of trust in national 
institutions. Without losing those who keep their faith in the political 
potential of the representative institutions, the Church maintains a solid 
core of supporters among the rest of citizens who partially or totally 
distrust national political actors.  
Ever closer Church 
The picture drawn by table 3 is somehow similar to what observed for 
the previous relationship with a minor difference: there are more 
respondents that did not answer to the question regarding trust in the EU 
than those that answered to the trust in national political institutions (see 
N at the end of tables 2 and 3). As a result, we may infer that people are 
able to evaluate their levels of confidence into the institutions they know 
better rather than in institutions about which they have marginal and 
truncated information.  
The figures in table 3 indicate that Romanians who trust the EU have 
a higher tendency to also trust the Church compared with the rest of the 
citizens. Nine out of 10 Romanians that trust the EU also trust the Church 
whereas only seven out of 10 people that do not trust the EU vest their 
confidence in the religious institutions. Moreover, the discrepancy 
between these two groups constantly increases during the examined 
period. If in 2002 the difference between supporters of the EU and non-
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supporters that trust the Church is of 12%, in 2007 this difference is of 21% 
with a maximum gap of 23% in 2005. At the same time, both groups register 
a stabilization of their current percentages starting 2004, the major 
oscillations being observed before that date.  
This trend can be linked with the stability of the trust in the EU 
registered after 2004 (see table 1). It corresponds to the immediate post-
accession period of the other candidate countries and with the final years 
of the pre-accession period for Romania. In this respect, after observing 
that their neighbors succeeded in their efforts for accession, the 
Romanians stabilized their opinions and created a linkage between the 
support for the international and the religious institutions. However, this 
process is possible due to the type of support that Romanian citizens attach 
to the EU. Quite intuitively, citizens in pre-accession periods display diffuse 
support for the EU, they trust the general structure of the Union, and they 
set their minds on the basis of the information received through official 
channels, most of the time at a general level. The specific support comes 
only after people start understanding how the EU works, what its values 
are and how they can interfere with national traditions. If the latter would 
have been expressed, our theoretical reasons indicate that it would have 
been difficult to register a positive relationship between the trust in the EU 
and in the Church.  
 
Table 3. Trust in the EU and in Church 
Trust in the EU?  
Trust in Church? No Yes  
No 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
 
 
19% 
29 
31 
32 
34 
34 
 
 
7% 
12 
12 
9 
17 
13 
 
Yes  
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
 
 
81% 
71 
69 
68 
66 
66 
 
 
93% 
88 
88 
91 
83 
87 
 
Strength of relationship 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
 
0.15 
0.2 
0.19 
0.27 
0.18 
0.24 
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Notes: 
- For the frequency table on trust in the EU and in Church, see Table 1 
- All relationships are significant at the 0.01 level 
- 799 ≤ N ≤ 863 
- Source CCEBs and EBs, 2002-2007. 
 
The correlation coefficients indicate that all relationships are 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level and are in the predicted direction. 
The strength of the relationship increases over the years, ranging from 
0.15 in 2002 to 0.24 in 2007 with a peak in 2005 (0.27). In this respect, the 
relationship between the trust in the EU and in the Church is stronger than 
the previous examined relationship between national political and 
religious institutions. The strength increases as the time of accession gets 
closer, as the EU ceases to be an ideal and becomes a reality for most of the 
citizens. Given the comparison of percentages and the value of the 
correlation coefficients, there is empirical support for hypothesis 2. 
The results so far indicate that the strongest relationship is between 
the trust in the EU and in religious institutions, becoming stronger as time 
passes by. The level of trust in national political institutions and in Church 
is also positively related indicating that people that trust in the former also 
vest more trust in the latter when compared with the rest. However, the 
difference between the groups is much smaller for this relationship than 
for the one detected for hypothesis 2. Overall, positive attitudes appear to 
enhance further positive attitudes. Beyond all emphasized mechanisms, 
Romanians that are confident in the political processes both at national 
and international level vest trust in the Church more than the others. More 
than 90% of the citizens supporting the EU trust the Church and almost 
95% of those trusting the national political institutions also trust the 
Church. What matters the most is the difference between this group and 
the rest of the population and it is small for national political institutions 
and increasingly higher for the EU. Having these relatively modest results, 
we conduct a binary logistic regression to observe the explanatory 
potential of the variables employed by the two hypotheses in predicting 
the level of trust in the Church in Romania. 
An explanatory model 
The results of the bivariate analyses suggest the existence of weak 
relationships for both hypotheses. They also indicate a hierarchy regarding 
the explanatory potential of the trust in the EU and in national political 
institutions. In order to provide a supplementary test, we employ a binary 
logistic regression for one of the six analyzed years. We chose 2007, as it is 
the most recent year and with high values on the correlation coefficients. 
The latter make this year the usual suspect to observe a relationship 
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between the three variables and if this is strong, we will expand it to the 
entire analyzed period.  
The dependent variable for this analysis is represented by trust in the 
Church. The reference category for trust in the EU and trust in national 
political institutions is the last category, namely the group of people that 
display trust in these institutions. The statistical results are displayed in 
table 4. The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit test (not reported in the 
table) is significant at the 0.01 level, implying that this is a well-fitting 
model. Consequently, we reject the null hypothesis that there is no 
difference between observed and model-predicted values of trust in the EU 
and in national political institutions and thus implying that the model's 
estimates fit the data at an acceptable level.  
The results of the logistic regression analysis confirm the earlier 
findings of the bivariate analyses. Nagelkerke’s R², indicating the amount 
of variation in the trust for Church explained by trust for the EU and 
national political institutions, is very small (0.1), showing that this model 
explains up to 10% of the variation in trust.59 This result is quite modest 
and leaves plenty of room for further explanations about the high level of 
trust in Church. 
 
Table 4: Binary logistic regression for trust in Church 
 B Exp(B) 
Constant  23,618   
Trust national institutions  Medium trust -1.5** ,23 
  Lack of trust -1.3* ,27 
 Trust EU Lack of trust -1.1** ,33 
* Significance at the 0.05 level 
** Significance at the 0.01 level 
 
The figures in table 4 fully support the evidence presented in tables 2 
and 3. Starting with the trust in national institutions (trust being the 
reference category), each shift from trust to medium trust decreases (b=-
1.3) the odds of trusting the Church by a factor of about 0.23, controlling 
for other variables in the model. That means that approximately one in 
five people that give up their trust in one national political institution 
decides to give up trust in Church. A similar result is registered when 
looking at those that lack trust in national institutions: when changing 
their option from trust to distrust, one in five (factor of 0.27) also start 
distrusting Church. Regarding the trust in the EU, the results are sharper, 
consistent with the relationships in table 3. Any additional respondent that 
does not trust the EU decreases (b=-1.1) the odds of trusting the Church by 
a factor of about 0.33, controlling for other variables in the model. 
Compared with those that trust the EU, one third of the non-supportive 
citizens display lack of trust in the Church (fully consistent with what is 
indicated in table 3. All these results should be seen on the background of 
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the model’s poor explanatory potential of 10% for the high level of trust in 
the Romanian Church.  
Conclusion and discussion 
This research attempted to explain the high level of trust in the 
Romanian Church on the background of a highly stable support for the EU 
and increasing discontent with the national political institutions. The 
results indicate that the lack of trust in national institutions and the 
beneficial impact of the EU on national politics impact only marginally on 
the level of support for the Church. The model including these two factors 
explains only 10% of the total variation of trust in Church. However, there 
are relevant findings at the level of each relationship. Regarding domestic 
political institutions, the more trust citizens have attached to them, the 
more they support the Church, leading to the assertion that positive 
attitudes trigger further optimism and trust in other types of institutions 
(i.e. religious). More stable and relevant trends are detected when 
referring to the EU and the Church.  Often seen as an alternative to 
dysfunctional domestic institutions, the EU is seen as beneficial for the 
country and as Romanians got closer to 2007, the positive relationship 
between those that vest confidence in it and in the Church strengthens and 
increases.  
There are two major implications of these conclusions for 
understanding citizens’ attitudes in Romania. First, citizens’ trust in the 
Church does not depend on their political perceptions. As the correlation 
and regression analyses indicate, the explanatory potential of the included 
variable is quite reduced. The motivations for Romanians to trust the 
Church are complex and do not match the patterns identified in other 
empirical settings. What strikes one the most is that religion is not seen as 
an alternative to political failures generated by often corrupt and seldom-
trusted national institutions. At the mass level, those that bear positive 
perceptions about politics vest more confidence in the Church. Second, 
variations of support across time appear to be explained more by trust in 
international organizations rather than domestic ones. With the accession, 
the former becomes more and more important.  
As the raised question remains largely unanswered after the empirical 
test, further research is necessary. The results of this study indicate that 
the institutional components are not valid tracks to investigate high levels 
of trust in the Church. Instead, particularizing the processes may provide 
fruitful results. Rather than asking about the general trust in the EU, one 
may include the particular effects caused by the EU as relevant factors to 
explain the trust in the Church: cultural openness, diminishing traditions, 
eliminating boundaries, individual vs. community values, etc. Each of these 
strikingly addresses issues raised by the ROC in its speech and may prove 
relevant in further investigations. Furthermore, perceptions of 
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problematic processes at the domestic level may be better particularized: 
corruption, clientelism, and administrative inefficiency are highly 
problematic and may involve ties with the Church as an alternative.  
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